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The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between the educational diversity of the board 
directors and the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return associated with the announcement of a 
M&A. The results show that the cumulative abnormal return is positively related to educational 
diversity, however the model exhibits significant heteroscedasticity and therefore the results 
cannot be accepted as conclusive. Several attempts at fixing the heteroscedasticity failed and 
statistically appropriate model relating the cumulative abnormal returns to the explanatory 
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Through acquisitions firm-specific assets housed within one organization are merged with assets in 
another organization to improve the productivity of the combined assets (Anand and Singh, 1997).  
The market reacts to the news of the acquisition by influencing the stock prices around the announcement 
time of the parties involved reflecting the market’s expectation about the profitability of this acquisition.  
The event study methodology is based on the fundamental idea that stock prices represent the discounted 
expected value of firms’ future stream of profits and is useful in order to understand the relationship 
between different firm characteristics and the event’s impact on the market’s reaction as reflected in the 
abnormal returns at the announcement. 
The impact of the announcement on the target is primarily determined by the premium paid and empirical 
studies, such as Franks et al. (1991), Dodd et al. (1977) and Jensen et al. (1983), generally conclude that 
targets earn a significant abnormal return while, on average, the bidding firms earn insignificantly 
different from zero returns. In order to study the quality of the acquisition from a value creating decision 
point of view I focus on the acquirers because the acquirers pay to acquire a target in order to get a benefit 
from that target. The determinants of performance of acquiring firms have been extensively studied 
empirically and in this study I use, as control variables, many of these previously examined determinants. 
The focus of this study is the acquirer’s board of directors because it is the ultimate decision maker in 
M&As, and in this study I rely upon two streams of research:  the role of education and the role of 
diversity in firm performance. In this paper, I examine the impact of board educational diversity on the 
acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return around the date of an acquisition in order to indirectly assess the 







As educational diversity is the primary focus of this study, I will begin by surveying the primary research 
in the area of manager education before moving on to the more general area of diversity.  
According to Becker (1993), human capital encompasses the knowledge, information, ideas, skills, and 
health of individuals, and age and education are a proxy for human capital. Education increases the value 
of human capital; thus, it may be an important characteristic for board members. Daily et al. (1994) use 
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education to represent the quality of a firm’s board and its decision making ability. Top managers of the 
firm are hired because of their superior ability and according to Bhagat et al. (2010), such ability consists 
of observable characteristics (e.g. educational backgrounds and work experiences) and unobservable 
characteristics (e.g. leadership and entrepreneurial skills). They contend that since the unobservable 
characteristics are relatively difficult to identify and measure, the observable characteristics may play an 
important role in determining this superior ability. Hambrick and Mason (1984) also state that observable 
characteristics (education and experience) are considered valid proxies for cognitive orientation, values, 
and knowledge base, which may in turn significantly influence decision making and managerial behavior. 
Gottesman and Morey (2006) state that educational qualification may be a proxy for intelligence and 
more intelligent managers are expected to be better decision makers than their less intelligent peers. 
Bantel and Jackson (1989) and Wiersema and Bantel (1992) suggest that CEOs with higher educational 
attainments are better able to process information and accept significant changes within the firm. 
Martins et al. (1996) and Williams et al. (1998) argue that board members with different functional, 
industrial, and educational backgrounds are more likely to experience differences in the way that they 
perceive, process, and respond to issues with which they are confronted and these differences are likely to 
influence positively the level of cognitive conflict. Cognitive conflict is the mental discomfort that people 
experience when confronted with new information that contradicts their prior beliefs and ideas, pushing 
them either to assimilate the new information into an existing schema or to accommodate the new 
information by creating a new schema. Jackson (1992) finds that individuals with dissimilar backgrounds 
are likely to possess different knowledge, skills, and expertise, which, when brought to a team decision-
making process, will increase its quality. Jehn et al. (1997) found that differences in educational 
background lead to an increase in task related debates in work teams. 
Addressing the association between the demographic diversity of top managers and firm performance, 
Smith et al. (1994) find that educational heterogeneity positively influences return on investments (ROI). 
Using growth in market share and growth in profits as dependent variables, Hambrick et al. (1996) 
provide evidence that the relationship between the average education level of top management team 
members and firm performance is positive and significant. Anderson et al. (2011) show that even though 
managers prefer homogenous boards, shareholders value diversity in terms of educational background 
and that there is a positive relationship between board heterogeneity and firm performance. But diversity 
might also pose problems, namely the difficulty of integration. Westphal and Milton (2000) find that 
homogeneity with respect to educational affiliation enhances social integration on boards. Burgess et al. 
(2000) found that social similarity (such as education and demography) may be an important factor for 
appointments to the board because individuals will often have shared values and attitudes and derive self-
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esteem from group membership. Similarity leads to self-validation, ease of communication and trusting 
relationships. The preference for those that are perceived as similar is particularly prevalent in situations 
of uncertainty and unfamiliarity. But the realization of the benefits that diversity can bring pushes firms to 
embrace diversity and Singh et al. (2011) in their study report of an increasing trend among companies to 
hire business executives from a variety of streams, especially from the broad stream of humanities and 
social sciences, and not just the stream of management and business studies. 
Research was also conducted for specific types of education. With respect to the firm’s research and 
development (R&D) spending, a number of studies provide evidence that CEOs with degrees in technical 
fields are likely to allocate more resources for the funding of R&D activities (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996; Barker and Mueller, 2002). Graham and Harvey (2002) suggest that chief financial officers (CFOs) 
holding MBA degrees are more likely to follow academic advice and employ present value techniques in 
evaluating new projects. Guner et al. (2008) find that directors from a corporate banking background are 
associated with poor acquisition outcomes, although it is unclear if this is a specific experience or a 
habitual way of thinking which is at fault.  Wadhwa et al. (2008) surveyed 652 US born entrepreneurs 
who started tech and engineering companies and found that 92% held bachelor’s degrees, 31% held 
master’s degrees and 10% held PhDs. Nearly half of these degrees were in Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM). One third of the degrees were business, accounting and finance. 
Founders holding MBA degrees established companies more quickly than others.  
 
There is a considerable difference between academic and professional opinions regarding the importance 
of skills. Shuayto (2013) conducted a survey research asking a group of prospective employers and a 
group of business school deans/directors of MBA programs to rank the most and least important skills for 
MBA graduates. According to the prospective employer respondents, the most important skills to be 
obtained by graduates are (in order of importance) responsibility and accountability, interpersonal skills, 
oral communication, teamwork, ethical values, decision-making and analytical skills, and creativity and 
critical thinking. Those attributes believed to be less important included written communication, time and 
project management, persuasive ability, presentation skills, ability to assimilate new technologies, 
computer skills, and global awareness. According to the business school deans/directors of MBA 
programs, the most important skills are (in order of importance) oral communication, written 
communication, interpersonal skills, decision making and analytical ability, responsibility and 
accountability, ability to work in teams, creativity and critical thinking skills. Deans/directors indicated 
that ethical values, computer skills, time and project management, persuasive ability and global awareness 
were less important attributes. Although Shuayto (2013) isn’t specifically about board directors, it is 
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interesting because it studies the skills needed for MBA graduates who are expected to be future 
managers. Given the difference of opinion I do not try to rank skills and education degrees by degree of 
importance but rather study the impact of their diversity on the board’s M&A decisions.  
I also look at graduate and postgraduate educational degrees. Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) argue that 
an academic degree such as a PhD could signal the superior quality of the human capital of the board 
members. Such a degree could indicate the director having spent a substantial time in the academic 
environment, which could have provided the director with valuable knowledge necessary for strategic 
decision making (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). In accordance with this view, Dalziel et al. (2011) 
argue that advanced degrees such as PhD could equip directors with extra skills that could be beneficial 
for the firm, especially in their R&D efforts. Ruigrok et al., (2006) find that a higher percentage of 
directors with PhDs are appointed to the boards as independent directors, who are expected to be more 
effective monitors, which is also a trait expected from directors with high levels of education. 
In this paper I will use educational degrees as proxies for specific types of intelligence based on 
Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory. The theory of multiple intelligences was proposed in 1983 by 
American developmental psychologist Howard Gardner in his book Frames of Mind: The Theory of 
Multiple Intelligences and this theory differentiates intelligence into specific abilities rather than seeing 
intelligence as dominated by a single general ability. Gardner articulated eight criteria for a behaviour to 
be considered an intelligence: potential for brain isolation by brain damage, place in evolutionary history, 
presence in core operations, susceptibility to encoding (symbolic expression), a distinct developmental 
progression, the existence of savants, prodigies and other exceptional people, and support from 
experimental psychology and psychometric findings. Based on these criteria Gardner identifies the 
following abilities as an intelligence type: musical-rhythmic, visual-spatial, verbal-linguistic, logical-
mathematical, bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal. Gardner argues that the IQ tests focus 
mostly on logical and linguistic intelligence and therefore misrepresent other abilities or simply do not 
capture them at all.    
Based on this theory Sharifi (2006) administered the Multiple Intelligence Questionnaire adapted from 
Douglas and Harms to 120 secondary school students and found a low to moderate but significant 
correlation among different kinds of intelligence and related school subject scores. He also found that 
interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence scores account for 22% of the variance, illustrating the 
difficulty in measuring these types of intelligences. Mankad (2015) in his paper presented an expert 
system that classifies an individual’s abilities, by conducting the Multiple Intelligences Questionnaire, 
into one of the three fields: engineering, management and science, thus relating the Multiple Intelligences 
Theory with specific fields. 
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The association between a primary intelligence and occupation was described in Dr. Thomas Armstrong 
book Multiple Intelligences in the Classroom (1994) and a short list is presented in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1       
Multiple Intelligences and Occupations 
Linguistic Intelligence librarian, curator, speech pathologist, writer, radio or TV 
announcer, journalist, lawyer 
Logical-Mathematical Intelligence auditor, accountant, mathematician, scientist, statistician, 
computer analyst, technician 
Spatial Intelligence engineer, surveyor, architect, urban planner, graphic artist, 
interior decorator, photographer, pilot 
Bodily-Kinesthetic Intelligence physical therapist, dancer, actor, mechanic, carpenter, forest 
ranger, jeweler 
Musical Intelligence musician, piano tuner, music therapist, choral director, 
conductor 
Interpersonal Intelligence administrator, manager, personnel worker, psychologist, nurse, 
public relations person, social director, teacher 
Intrapersonal Intelligence psychologist, therapist, counselor, theologian, program 
planner, entrepreneur 
 
The directors’ education is a new and growing field of study and there are several working papers 
specifically studying it. Wagner et al. (2015) find that more qualified directors receive higher pay, largely 
because they are allocated more board functions relative to CEO-appointed (“co-opted”) directors, and 
announcement returns around unexpected director departures suggest that the market values qualified 
directors and discounts co-opted ones. Dionne et al. (2013) find a difference between the impact of 
limited experience and education-enhanced experience by showing that financially educated directors 
encourage the use of derivatives and hedging activity in contrast to directors with only financial or 
accounting experience or accounting. Kalyta (2014) shows that director education, especially in science 
and engineering, positively affects ROE for technology companies. 
 
The other control variables include variables that were already used in previous papers studying the 
acquirer’s abnormal return around announcement date, as well as variables that were not used in that kind 
of research, but were found to be important board attributes. It is important to include control variables 
because they might have an influence on the cumulative abnormal return and omitting them can result in 





Ning et al. (2010) find that most boards have between eight and eleven directors. Boards with seven or 
fewer directors tend to increase their size, while large boards with twelve or more directors tend to reduce 
their size to the target zone. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that large boards can be 
costly. Larger boards increase operational complexity and increase the potential for dissention among 
members. When board size increases, agency problems in the boardroom increase simultaneously, leading 
to more free-riding problems and internal conflicts among directors. On the other hand, Dalton et al. 
(1999) find a non-zero and positive board size and performance association. Booth and Deli (1996) argue 
that environmental uncertainty generally leads to large board size.  
 
Multiple directorships 
There are two competing hypotheses on the issue. First, the number of outside directorships may signal 
director quality (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Mace (1996) suggests that outside directorships are perceived 
to be valuable because they provide executives with prestige, visibility, and commercial contacts. 
Directors with more outside board seats may be more experienced, provide better advice, and offer better 
monitoring. If this is the case, they should help attenuate agency costs and discourage value-reducing 
acquisitions that are motivated by agency conflicts. This hypothesis is called the reputation hypothesis 
and predicts that market reaction is more positive (or less negative) for acquiring firms where directors 
hold more outside board seats. By contrast, the busyness hypothesis contends that directors with too many 
outside board seats may be so busy that they do not function as effective monitors. This diminished 
oversight may lead to more severe agency conflicts, because managers are better able to pursue their own 
private benefits at the expense of the shareholders. One well-known consequence of agency conflicts is 
the depletion of free cash flows on unnecessary acquisitions that destroy value (Jensen, 1986). 
Brown and Maloney (1999) compare the board characteristics of acquiring firms that are well and poorly 
governed, respectively, and investigate the role of directors in acquisition decisions. They find that 
directors in bad acquirers hold more directorships (2.35 on average) compared to those in good acquirers 
(1.87 on average). Ahn et al. (2010) show that the effect of multiple directorships is nonlinear on 
acquisition performance. Multiple outside board seats induce negative announcement returns only when 
the number of multiple directorships reaches a high threshold. In the same logic Core et al. (1999) found 
that too many directorships may lower the effectiveness of outside directors as corporate monitors. 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms with boards where the majority of outside directors are busy 
(i.e., holding three or more directorships) are associated with weak corporate governance, lower market 





According to the upper-echelons perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), CEOs act based on their 
understanding of the strategic situations they confront. This understanding is significantly shaped by their 
tenure (Souder, Simsek & Johnson, 2012), which mirrors their paradigms, skills, knowledge and 
cognition (Barker & Mueller, 2002) acquired during their tenure. 
Henderson et al. (2006) view tenure effect as being nonlinear and argue that CEOs pass through two 
phases during their time in office: the first phase is an initial period of adaptive improvement, and in the 
second phase, CEOs become overly committed to existing approaches and tend to embrace the status quo, 
so the effectiveness of CEOs increases up to a certain point in time and then starts diminishing.  
This nonlinear relation was seen in the influence of CEO tenure on firm inventiveness (Wu, Levitas & 
Priem, 2005) and firm internationalization (Jaw & Lin, 2009) and is likely to follow the pattern of an 
inverted-U shape.  
Walters et al. (2007) explore the impact of CEO tenure on returns to shareholders arising from acquisition 
announcements. Further, they consider the value added for shareholders when the board of directors is 
composed in such a way as to enhance vigilance. In the absence of a vigilant board, CEO tenure is 
positively associated with performance at low to moderate levels of tenure, and negatively associated with 
performance when tenure further rises to substantial levels. In the presence of a vigilant board, however, 
shareholder interests can be advanced even at high levels of CEO tenure. 
Industry Relatedness 
The ability to use new information to solve problems is enhanced when the new knowledge is related to 
what is already known (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).Acquiring unrelated businesses reduces productivity 
and is found to be problematic (Singh and Montgomery, 1987) so I will look at whether the bidder and 
the target are from the same industries using the 2 and 3 digit SIC codes. 
 
Female directors 
Research suggests that women exhibit less overconfidence compared to men (Johnson et al., 2006), with 
overconfidence linked to the propensity to take excess risks and make poor financial decisions (Barber 
and Odean, 2001). Thus a greater representation of women should reduce excessively risky decisions and 
it was found that an increased female director representation has been linked to higher-quality earnings 
(Srinidhi et al. 2011). Carter et al. (2003) find that ethnic and gender diversity among a board of directors 
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is associated with higher firm value for a sample of large US firms which implies that there are gender 
and ethnic specific characteristics which contribute to value creation and better decision making. Levi et 
al. (2013) found an inverse relation between the number of bids and premium paid, and the number of 
females on the board and this again reflects women’s greater aversion to risk and overspending. So a 
greater female representation can be viewed as a contribution to monitoring and risk reduction. 
Firm size 
Netter et. al (2011) find acquisitions to generally be value-neutral for large companies, in addition to 
being a distraction of management focus. Swanstorm (2006) find a significant negative relationship 
between the log of firm size and M&A CAR, and a positive relationship with a dummy variable 
corresponding to cash acquisition. Stulz et al.(2004) find that the announcement return for acquiring-firm 
shareholders is roughly two percentage points higher for small acquirers irrespective of the form of 
financing and whether the acquired firm is public or private. However, Alexandridis, et al. (2013) show 
that larger bidders make better takeovers.  It should be noted that Stulz et al. sample is dominated by 
nonpublic targets while Alexandridis et al.(2013) exclusively work on a subsample of public targets. In 
my case I have both public and public targets (which will be discussed later) and therefore the size effect 
will be viewed globally irrespective of firm type. 
 
Intense Monitoring 
Agency theorists argue that independent directors are charged with the responsibility of monitoring 
managers to act in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)and of facilitating access 
to critical information and valuable resources (Chen, 2011).  
Kroll et al. (1990) found that CEO compensation increased following acquisitions due in part to the 
increased size of the firm, so managers may behave in their own interest in M&A decisions as opposed to 
shareholders’ interest.  McWilliams and Sen (1997) observe negative market reaction to antitakeover 
announcements. This reaction is more pronounced when the board is dominated by insider and gray 
directors and where the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Faleye et al. (2011) show that boards 
where the majority of independent board members qualify as “intense monitors” (the members serve on at 
least two of the three principal monitoring committees – audit, compensation and nominating) display 
superior monitoring performance ,although too much board monitoring can decrease shareholder value 
(Almazan and Suarez, 2003). So intense monitoring seems to be beneficial up to a certain point where it 




Shivdasani (1993) finds that the ownership of large unaffiliated block holders increases the probability of 
hostile takeovers. Since the unaffiliated block holders are concerned with the performance of the 
company, they facilitate outsiders in the takeover of the target firm, especially when the target firm is not 
performing well, by selling their block holding to the bidder, and by doing so they act as a 
countermeasure to an inefficient and entrenched board and help the firm be acquired by another firm 
which can manage it better. On the contrary, block holders affiliated to management support the 
resistance of takeovers by the managers and thus reduce the possibility for hostile takeover. Shleifer and 
Vishney (1986) develop a theoretical model which explains how large external shareholders may 
facilitate takeovers by selling their shares to bidding firms when incumbent managers are 
underperforming and unwilling to implement reforms. 
Higher ownership concentration in the form of blockholdings (above 5%) was also found to be generally 
associated with improved monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Chen et al. (2007) provided evidence 
that long-term and independent institutional block holders can effectively prevent the management of 
U.S. acquiring firms from initiating value-destroying acquisitions. Martin (1996) showed that higher 
institutional block-holdings also decrease the probability of using stock to pay for takeovers which would 
in turn reduce their ownership. Given these findings block holders are viewed as owners who are 
interested in the profitability of the acquisition and who use their influence to ensure it becomes so.   
 
Acquirer debt  
Gibb et al. (2013) study the sources of value in M&A by studying the difference between the WACCs of 
the combined firm and the merging firms. They find that the component of value associated with the 
difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer is mainly determined by leverage 
of the acquiring firm and the method of payment. While cash payment is value creating, high leverage of 
the acquirer prior to an acquisition can destroy value by raising the cost of capital of the firm.  
 Uysal,(2011) found that firms that are underleveraged relative to their target debt ratios are more likely to 
make acquisitions and that the market reacts unfavorably to takeover announcements of underleveraged 
bidders, consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis, meaning that those firms might spend their 
resources in not the most efficient ways. Maloney et al. (1993) find that market reactions increase with 
the bidder’s leverage ratio and Gao (2011) found that announcement returns are lower for a bidder 
with a higher excess cash reserve. So contrary to intuition, an acquirer’s higher debt ratio can be 
positively viewed by the market because it signals that the acquirer tries to act in the best way because 
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their resources are limited which would make them more risk averse and more reluctant to spend 
carelessly.  
 
Target type, relative size  
Jansen et al. (2012) finds that acquiring firms’ abnormal returns are increasing in relative size for private 
targets, small acquirers, and cash acquisitions, and that they are decreasing in relative size for public 
targets, large acquirers, and equity acquisitions of non-public targets. On the other hand, Asquith et al. 
(1983) finds that bidder returns are positively related to the relative size of the target when the target is 
public. Alexandridis et al. (2013) found a robust negative relation between offer premia and 
target size, meaning that the acquirer overpays less the bigger is the target.  It is of interest to see 
whether firms of similar size are believed to create bigger synergies than firms of different sizes when the 
smallest firm might simply be engulfed and be too small to affect the bigger firm.    
Prior research has shown that acquisitions of private targets tend to be value-creating while those of 
public targets tend to be value destroying (Hansen and Lott, 1996; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002).  
Moeller et al. (2003) find that the shareholders of the acquiring firm gain the most when the firm acquires 
a subsidiary or a private firm and that the only acquisitions that have positive aggregate dollar gains for 
shareholders are acquisitions of subsidiaries. Fuller et al. (2002) find that acquisitions of private firms 
paid for with equity have a positive abnormal return in their sample.                                                                                                                        
CEO centrality and duality 
M&As are very important corporate events for bidding firms and their CEOs. M&As allow CEOs to 
showcase their network influence both internally, when they persuade directors to support CEO decisions 
in initiating possibly value-destroying deals, and externally, as well-networked CEOs may obtain and 
utilize private information from their network contacts to aid in bidding and negotiation. 
Management research documents the importance of central positions in a network in gaining better access 
to information and knowledge transfer (Tsai 2001) and social science research suggests that better-
connected (i.e. more central) individuals are more influential and/or powerful (Mizruchi and Potts 1998). 
But powerful CEOs don’t necessarily benefit the bidding firm and it was shown by Masulis et al. (2007) 
that potential stronger bidder CEO entrenchment (due to strong CEO power and influence) generally 
leads to poor decision making and value losses. Fogel et al. (2012) studied CEO network centrality and 
acquisition performance and found that more centrally positioned CEOs are more likely to bid for other 
publicly traded firms, and these deals carry greater value losses to the acquirer, and greater losses to the 
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combined entity. Liu (2010)shows that more central CEOs are less likely to be disciplined by managerial 
labor market even though such CEOs are associated with more frequent turnover (i.e, fired for poor 
performance), but nevertheless they are also more likely to be quickly reemployed (without a decline in 
compensation). 
Masulis et al. (2007) find that CEO duality (when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and therefore 
more powerful) is negatively related to acquirer returns among US firms. Their findings suggest that 
CEOs at firms with more antitakeover provisions (ATPs) tend to make less profitable acquisitions as they 
do not face the disciplinary threat of loss of corporate control. 
The literature review is summarized in the following table: 
 
 
Table 2     
Literature review summary  
Factor Description 
Education Education increases the board’s human capital and is a proxy for intelligence and ability 
for good management and decision making. Higher education (MBA, PhD) was also 
found to positively affect the quality of the board. 
Diversity Board diversity, including educational, positively affect the level of cognitive conflict 




MIT contends that there are 6 different types of intelligences and individuals might 
possess several types to different degrees, and specific educational degrees and work 
occupations correspond to these intelligence types.   
Board size Small boards tend to increase in size while big boards tend to decrease in size since 
having more board members brings more knowledge, connections and task delegations 
while also bringing more complexity. 
Multiple 
directorships 
Effect on bidder CAR is nonlinear – having more directorships brings more knowledge, 
connections and prestige but if board members hold too many outside directorships the 
quality of their decisions becomes questionable due to their busyness.   
CEO tenure Effect on bidder CAR is non linear as it is positive the more tenured is the CEO 
(reflecting a growing experience) up to a point when tenure is too high (reflecting more 
power to act at owns interest) and effect becomes negative. 
Industry 
relatedness 
Acquiring unrelated businesses was found to be problematic and reducing productivity 
of the combined entity since it is harder to integrate unrelated knowledge. 
Female 
directors 
Women were found to be less overconfident then men and a greater representation of 
women in the board was found to be linked to higher quality earnings. A greater 
representation of women was also found to be inversely related to the number of bids 
that a company made and the amount of the premium paid. 
Firm size Research mostly finds that smaller acquirers get a greater CAR than bigger acquirers 
(and bidder CAR even being negative).  
Intense 
monitoring 
Effect on bidder CAR is nonlinear; increased number of independent directors in key 
committees increases monitoring to the benefit of the shareholders up to a point when 
too many independent directors prevent the firm from developing. 
Block holders Act as monitors and have the power to prevent value destroying acquisitions, and reduce 
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the probability of using stock to pay for acquisitions. 
Acquirer debt Higher debt levels of the bidder result in higher CAR because firms with larger cash 
levels are perceived to use their cash not most efficiently (free cash flow hypothesis). 
Target type Robust positive relation between bidder CAR and private and subsidiary targets. 
Relative size Acquirer’s CAR increases in relative size for private targets but decrease in relative size 
for public targets. Offer premia paid is also smaller the bigger is the target relative to the 
acquirer. 
CEO centrality More central CEOs are more influential and have better access to information. More 
centrally CEOs were found to be more likely to bid for public firms and these deals 
carry losses to the acquirer and the combined entity. More central CEOs are also less 
likely to be disciplined for bad performance. 





I will test how the educational diversity of the board affects the decision making quality when it comes to 
Mergers and Acquisitions as measured by the Cumulative Abnormal Return of the acquirer. Given all the 
research that relates education and diversity to better management and decision making, my hypothesis is 
that the market reaction to the acquirer’s announcement is positively related to the diversity of its board. It 
should be noted that my assumption here is that the market reacts to the quality of the decision making 
which is influenced by the board’s educational diversity. In other words, educational diversity is a proxy 
for the unobservable business intelligence factor driving strategic decision making. 
H1: educational diversity of the acquirer’s boards is positively related to the acquirer’s cumulative 
abnormal return around the time of the announcement.        
Methodology 
SCD: M&A data  
The M&A data was obtained from the SDC data base. The time period is from January 2004 to December 
2014 and includes only announcements where the target and the bidder are US companies. All deals are 
friendly and completed. At this stage the SDC database has 26 991 M&A announcements.  
Financials (Real Estate, Funds, Banks etc) were omitted from the selection process and the final SDC data 




Boardex: Board Data 
Data about the board of directors was obtained from Boardex. This data set contains annual information 
about a company’s directors, measured at the end of the year.  
Final Data 
The final data is formed by merging the previous 2 data sets and consists of 4617 M&As. It is on this data 
set that the analysis will be applied. 
The dependent variable is CAR3 which is the Cumulative Abnormal Return measured from 3 days before 
to 3 days after the M&A announcement date and was estimated using WRDS EVENTUS. The estimation 
period ends 46 days, the minimum estimation length is 3 days and the maximum estimation length is 255 
days. The market index is CRSP equally weighted and the returns are market adjusted. During an event 
study, the market price of each of the acquirer’s is regressed (OLS) against the CRSP equally weighted 
index for a duration of 255 days ending 46 days before the event. Then from this regression the acquirer’s 
market price is fitted around the announcement date and the difference between the actual price and the 
expected price is calculated, and it is the abnormal return, presumably due to the event. The abnormal 
returns are aggregated for the period starting 3 days before the announcement and ending 3 days after, 
thus giving the cumulative abnormal return. 
The Boardex data contains the education qualifications of the directors. There are 936 different 
qualifications which will be categorized into 6 categories and with these categories I create a 
concentration measure similar to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (based on the measure used Kim et al. 
2010) reflecting the educational diversity of the board, where a smaller value indicates a more diverse 
board. The measure is calculated by taking the proportion of each category to the total sum of the 
categories and squaring it. Then all the 6 squares are summed. 
To categorize intelligence and knowledge by education is no easy task. Some people might have a certain 
degree but work in a different field and therefore it is their experience which is a better indicator of their 
acquired knowledge. But since it was not possible to extract a director’s experience in a measurably 
meaningful way, this important variable will be unfortunately omitted. Boardex contains the previous 
work places of the directors, but doesn’t indicate what exactly the directors were doing in their previous 
roles.    
14 
 
Six categories of educational qualification were used in order to have as many distinct intelligence types 
as possible and at the same time not to have too many types because otherwise the concentration becomes 
too dilute and more homogenous to the extent that there is no significant variety between the boards. 
Also, each director can be included at most once in each category: for example, if a director has a 
bachelor’s and a master’s in business and a bachelor’s in science, he will be counted once for the business 
and once for the science category, otherwise the concentration is becoming uplifted and then again the 
boards become more homogeneous. Since higher degrees might represent additional knowledge, they will 
be treated separately (PhD and MBA dummy variables).     
The choice of the categories is partly based on research where certain of the variables were used in the 
analysis because they indicated specific knowledge deemed important for running a business (such as law 
and business in Kim et al.2010) or because they represent an intelligence type according to Gardner’s 
Multiple Intelligence Theory (Gardner 1989). 
The law (category 6) category represents all the terminal law degrees. The business category (category 3) 
accounts for different business degrees like accounting, finance, marketing etc. degrees except for 
management. Management (category 4) is a category by itself because directors are managers and 
therefore this skill is probably among the most sought after for their position, and this category is also a 
proxy for Gardner’s interpersonal intelligence because successful management requires interaction with 
people and a multiple intelligence survey of managers by Wilson et al. (2010) found this type of 
intelligence to be the second most important, after intrapersonal. 
The other 3 categories are proxies for some of Gardner’s intelligence types: Arts (category 1) consists of 
degrees such as literature, communication, and other arts faculty degrees and correspond to lingual-verbal 
intelligence. Science (category 2) corresponds to logical/mathematical intelligence. The last category (5) 
consists of degrees such as engineering, technical abilities, medical degrees. This category corresponds to 
visual/spatial-motor skill intelligence. Musical intelligence was not included because of a lack of a 
sufficient number of degrees, and intrapersonal intelligence was not included because of a lack of a clear 
determinant what degree can proxy for this type of intelligence, although as mentioned above it’s was 







First I want to look at the categories and their distributions for the sample and the Boardex population 
Table 3       
The percentage of the education categories 
for the sample and Boardex     
Category  Sample Boardex 
Arts  22.39 21.93 
Science  27.7 26.78 
Business  14.52 15.91 
Management  23.76 22.26 
Technical  4 4.95 
Law  7.62 8.16 
total  100 100 
 
The largest category in the sample and Boardex is category 2 (science) followed by category 4 
(management), category 1 (arts) and category 3 (business). Category 5 (technical) is the smallest 
category, followed by 6 (law), although since category 6 consists solely of law, it implies a significant 
representation. The percentages of the categories are similar between the sample and Boardex, with 
categories 1, 2 and 4 slightly increasing in the sample, and categories 3, 5 and 6 decreasing, and this trend 
continues for the sample occurrences (except for category 6), although differences are small.     
Gender diversity has recently been a subject of increasing research and I examine the female proportions 
as well. The gender distributions for the sample and Boardex: 
Table 4     
Sample and Boardex gender percentage     
Gender Sample  Boardex  
Female 9.33 8.18 
Male 90.67 91.82 
Total 100 100 
 
There are slightly more females in the sample than in the Boardex population, implying that acquirers 
have more females than the average for the population, although this difference is small. For both groups 
each female director is counted once, whereas in Sample (occurrence) it is the occurrence of females 
which is counted, since a director can serve on a bidder’s board more than once and a bidder can occur 
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more than once, i.e complete more than one acquisition. The percentage of female occurrences is slightly 
greater than the percentage of female directors in the sample, implying that the average female has a 
higher participation in bids, although this difference is small as well. Female proportion is also observed 
for the different categories in order to see any specific distribution. 
Table 5     
Sample and Boardex female  
percentage by category 
Category F sample F Boardex 
Arts 12.95 10.62 
Science 8.09 7.20 
Business 9.16 8.30 
Management 9.42 8.40 
Technical 8.02 5.65 
Law 10.22 8.48 
 
The percentage of females in the sample is greater than in the Boardex population for all categories. For 
both groups, category 1 has the biggest female percentage (arts) followed by category 6(law). I also did a 
Chi-Square test for the sample to see whether the proportions of females are the same across the 
categories or not. The Chi Square test statistic is calculated as follows: 
 
In order to calculate the expected frequency of males and females in each category first have to calculate 
the total sample ratio of females to males, and then for each category to multiply that ratio by the total 
number of directors. The summation sums 12 numbers because there are 6 categories and 2 genders 
which when multiplied makes 12. The next step is to calculate the degrees of freedom which equals 
(number of rows-1)*(number of columns-1) = (6-1)*(2-1)=5. The null hypothesis is that the gender 
proportion is the same across the education categories. When the null hypothesis is true the sampling 
distribution of the test statistic is a Chi Square distribution and given the Chi Square test statistic and the 
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degrees of freedom we can obtain the probability of the test statistic and using SAS we obtain the 
following: 
Statistic DF Value Prob 
Chi-Square 5 102.446 <.0001 
 
Given the probability which is very small, we reject the null hypothesis and therefore the proportions of 
women directors are not the same across the education categories, and from observation see that the 
proportion of women is greater for the Arts and Law categories and this is in line with the finding of 
Sharifi (2006) that girls tend to have higher grades in linguistic school subjects. The SAS for this Chi 
Square test is found in Appendix A1.    
 The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR3 and for the sample the vast majority of the CAR3s are 
centered around on zero percent. Figure1 shows the distribution of CAR3 and figure 2 shows the 
probability plot of CAR3. 






The mean is actually positive and equals 1.36% (and is statistically different from zero acording to the 
tests for location) for the sample with standard deviation of 11.95%. Most of the CAR3s are centered 




The centerpiece of my analysis is a linear regression. The dependent variable CAR3 is the acquirer’s 
cumulative abnormal return for the whole period of between 3 days before and 3 days after the 
announcement. CAR3 is fitted against the education concentration and other control variables to see how 
they impact CAR3 (SAS code for the regression in appendix A3). 
The model: 
CAR3 = β1*education concentration + β2*institutional concentration + β3*market size + β4*debt 
to market + β5*deal to market + β6*CEO centrality + β7*CEO tenure + β8*CEO tenure2 + 
β9*total boards to date + β10*total current boards + β11*total current boards2 + β12*independent 
past CFO + β13*board size + β14*board size2 + β15*intense monitor + β16*industry relatedness + 
β17*female + β18*duality + β19*priv 
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The description of the variables and their expected vs. their fitted signs are given in the following table: 
Table 6     
Independent variables description, fitted and expected relation with the CAR3  





The HHI-like variable for measuring the diversity of the board of 







The HHI-like variable for measuring Block Holders ownership, a 










Debt-to-market The ratio of the acquirer’s debt to its market value at the moment 





Deal-to-market The ratio of the value of the deal to the market value of the 





CEO centrality The number of directors from the Boardex dataset who have a 
connection to the acquirer’s CEO at the moment of the 




CEO tenure The amount of time the CEO has been in his position at the 






The total number of boards that the acquirer’s directors sat on prior 
to the announcement, reflecting a “collective experience” and 






The total number of boards that the acquirer’s directors sat on at 




Ind past CFO 
fraction 
The fraction of the independent directors to the total directors who 
have previously in their career held the position of a CFO 
Unexplored Linear 
positive 
Ind past CFO The total number of the independent directors who have previously 
in their career held the position of a CFO 
Unexplored Linear 
negative 






Intense monitor Dummy variable equal to 1 if the majority of the independent 





A dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer’s and target’s first 3 
digits of the 4 digit SIC code are the same 
Positive Negative 
PRIV A dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a private company, as 
compared to a public company 
Positive Positive 
Female Total number of female directors on the acquirer’s board at the 













And here are the regression results: 
Table 7     
Regressions results of the model. CAR3 is the dependent variable. 
*,**,*** means significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively   
Variable Parameter Estimate  t-value 
Intercept 0.0082 0.22 
education concentration -0.036 -2.41** 
institutional concentration 0.0414 3.61*** 
market size 0.0001 0.10 
debt to market 0.0174 13.59*** 
deal to market 0.0549 30.31*** 
ceo centrality 0 0.49 
ceo tenure  -0 -0.16 
ceo tenure
2
  0 1.12 
total boards to date 0.0001 1.26 




independent past cfo fraction 0.13 2.42** 
independent past cfo   -0.0186 -2.91*** 




intense monitor -0.0988 -3.24*** 
industry relatedness (sic3) -0.0054 -1.81* 
industry relatedness (sic2) -0.0063 -2.05** 
Female -0.0004 -0.19 
Duality -0.0013 -0.4 
Priv 0.0356 7.7*** 
 
The variable education concentration is significant and negative, meaning that the more diverse is the 
board the greater in the acquirer’s CAR3. As a robustness check, I also estimated the model using the 6 
category variables (6 dummies) as well as including the PhD and MBA variables (counting the total such 
degrees in the board) but all were insignificant. A dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer is a high tech 
company was also turned out to be insignificant.  
In order to accept the results of the regression I tested whether the distribution of error terms are 
homoscedastic and normally distributed. Homoscedasticity describes a situation in which the error term 
(the difference between the actual data and the fitted data) is the same across all values of the independent 
variables, i.e has the same variance. Heteroscedasticity (violation of homoscedasticity) is present when 
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the size of the error term differs across values of the independent variables. When this occurs the areas 
with greater variance (as is demonstrated in figure 3) will have a greater pull on the fitted model than 
other observations and this is because the OLS is fitting the model with the smallest sum of squares of the 
error terms and since observations with greater variance have bigger errors their square term of the error 
will also be bigger and therefore the adjustment is more influenced by them. According to Berry and 
Feldman (1985) and Tabachnick and Fidel (1996) slight heteroscedasticity has little effect on significance 
tests, but when heteroscedasticity is large it can lead to serious distortion of the findings and increase the 
possibility of a Type I error (incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis). 
As an illustration, figure 3 shows a case of homoscedasticity and in it the fitted line is flat which could 
imply a true null hypothesis, but in the case of heteroscedasticity the line is pulled upwards which could 
imply a positive relation when there should be none.        
 
Figure 2. Heteroscedasticity depiction 
 
Testing for heteroscedasticity. 
Two tests will be used to determine whether heteroscedasticity is present in the model: the Breusch-Pagan 
and Whites’s tests. 
22 
 
The Breusch-Pagan tests whether the estimated variance of the residuals from a regression is dependent 
on the values of the independent variables and if that is the case then heteroscedasticity is present. The 
test takes the squared residuals of the fitted model and fits them against the independent variables in a 
second auxiliary regression. The idea behind the test is that squared residuals from the original model 
serve as a proxy for the variance of the error term at each observation (the error term is assumed to have a 
mean of zero, and the variance of a zero-mean random variable is the expectation of its square). The 
independent variables in the auxiliary regression account for the possibility that the error variance 
depends on the values of the original independent variables in some linear way. 
White’s test is similar to the Breusch-Pagan, with the addition that its auxiliary regression incorporates 
the squares and the cross products of the independent variables as well, and therefore is able to detect a 
more general form of heteroscedasticity. 
The null hypothesis for both tests is that there is no heteroscedasticity in the original regression and the 
statistical hypothesis test is the Chi Square test (appendix A4 for the SAS code). 
Table 8     
Heteroscedasticity of the Errors Tests 
 
  
      
Test Pr>ChiSq   
White's Test <.0001   
Breusch-Pagan <.0001   
 
Both tests reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity.  
Looking at the Residual vs CAR3 plot in figure 4 will give some visual idea on how the errors are 








Figure 3. Residual vs CAR3 plot 
 
It can be seen that there seems to be a linear “45 degree” relation between the residuals and CAR3s, and 
the variation increases as the CAR3 approaches 0. I tried several times to cut the tails by various degrees 
since the absolute value of the Student Residual increases with the absolute value of the residual, but 
heteroscedasticity was still present. The Studenstized Residual is the quotient of the division of a residual 
by an estimate of its standard deviation. The studentized residual is used to find outliers because the 
standard deviations of residuals in a sample can vary greatly between different points, even if the errors 
have the same stabdard deviation, so it is not completely correct to detect outliers simply by looking at the 
size of the residual. 
Testing for Normality 
Normality of the error terms is the other necessary assumption for a regression which is important for 
accurate calculation of the p – values and significance testing, although this assumption is not needed for 
the validity of the OLS model. When the errors are normal the OLS estimator is equivalent to the 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator and is asymptotically efficient. When the sample size is large, it is 
possible to derive the asymptotic properties of the interval estimates of the model parameters even if we 
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don’t make any assumption about the distribution of the error term, by virtue of the Central Limit 
Theorem. But I will do the normality tests nevertheless.   
Three tests will be used to test for the normality of the errors: Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramer-von Mises 
and Anderson Darling. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a nonparametric test of the equality of continuous, one-
dimensional probability distributions that can be used to compare a sample with a reference probability 
distribution (one-sample K–S test), or to compare two samples (two-sample K–S test). The Kolmogorov–
Smirnov statistic quantifies a distance between the empirical distribution function of the sample and 
the cumulative distribution function of the reference distribution, or between the empirical distribution 
functions of two samples. The null distribution of this statistic is calculated under the null hypothesis that 
the sample is drawn from the reference distribution (in the one-sample case) or that the samples are drawn 
from the same distribution (in the two-sample case). In the special case of testing for normality of the 
distribution, samples are standardized and compared with a standard normal distribution.  
The Cramer-von Mises criterion is a criterion used for judging the goodness of fit of a cumulative 
distribution function  compared to a given empirical distribution function , and in this case the 
cumulative distribution function of the errors is compared to the normal distribution. 
The Anderson-Darling test is a statistical test of whether a given sample of data is drawn from a 
given probability distribution. In its basic form, the test assumes that there are no parameters to be 
estimated in the distribution being tested, in which case the test and its set of critical values is 
distribution-free. When applied to testing if a normal distribution adequately describes a set of data, it is 
one of the most powerful statistical tools for detecting most departures from normality (Stephens, 1974). 
Tests for the normality of the error terms (appendix A5): 
Table 9     
Normality of the Errors Tests 
 
  
      
Test p Value   
Kolmogorov-Smirnov <0.01   
Cramer-von Mises <0.005   
Anderson-Darling <0.005   
 
All normality tests reject the hypothesis of normality, so the error terms are not normally distributed. 
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So the results from the regression are dubious because the assumptions of heteroscedasticity and 
normality of the error terms are not met and therefore the inference about the model’s parameters and 
their significance are not conclusive. 
Addressing the Heteroscedasticity Problem 
Box Cox Transformation 
The Box-Cox (Box  Cox, 1964) provides a family of transformations that will optimally normalize a 
particular variable, eliminating the need to randomly try different transformations to determine the best 
option.  This is a useful data transformation technique used to stabilize variance and make the data 
more normal distribution-like 
The one-parameter Box–Cox transformations are defined as: 
 
The Box Cox transformation attempts to find the exponent (Lambda) for the y variable that will transform 
the data into a normal shape. The transformation is done using different Lambdas, and the best Lambda is 
the one that results in the smallest standard deviation of the data, although it is customary to use the 
“standard” Lambda (e.g -1, 0.5, 2 etc.) closest to the resulting Lambda. The transformation which results 
in the smallest standard deviation of the data by itself isn’t a guarantee for normality, but rather the 
transformed data has the highest likelihood of being normal when the standard deviation is the smallest, 
and might mitigate heteroscedasticity. Consider the example by King et al. (2014) that illustrates the Box-
Cox transformation which also results in the error terms becoming homoscedastic: 
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Since about half of the CAR3s in the data are negative it is necessary to add a constant to the CAR3s 
before applying the transformation (a square root cannot be taken of a negative number for example). 
Osborne (2002) recommends anchoring at 1 (i.e, making the smaller value equal to 1) because numbers 
above 0.00 and below 1.0 behave differently than numbers 0.00, 1.00 and those larger than 1.00. The 
square root of 1.00 and 0.00 remain 1.00 and 0.00, respectively, while numbers above 1.00 always 
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become smaller, and numbers between 0.00 and 1.00 become larger. Since the smallest CAR is equal to -
0.55 I will add 1.55 to the CARs. 
Using SAS to calculate the best transformation we get λ=-1. So the newly transformed dependent variable 
becomes 1 – 1/(y+1.55). (SAS code is appendix A6). 
But there is still heteroscedasticity according to the White and Breusch-Pagan tests, both giving a 
probability of less than 0.0001 
FGLS 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares is a special case of Generalized Least Squares. GLS is a technique for 
estimating the unknown parameters of a linear regression and making a heteroscedastic model into a 
homoscedastic one if the variance-covariance matrix of the error term is known. 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares is a method used when there is heteroscedasticity but the variance of 
the error terms is unknown and has to be estimated. To estimate a FGLS model, I begin by extracting the 
error terms, u, from the original OLS regression. Then I assume that the error terms are a function of the 
independent variables and estimate a regression, by taking log on both sides, where the dependent 





WLS (Weighted Least Squares) takes each observation and divides it by its variance (which is the value 
along the diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix) so as to standardise the variance and make it equal 
for all the observations and thus eliminating heteroscedasticity. 
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FGLS by itself is biased (that is, the mean of the sampling distribution of the estimator is not equal to the 
true parameter value), but for large samples it is asymptotically unbiased, so it’s consistent (meaning that 
the estimator converges to the true value as the sample size increases). 
But this method resulted in R square being 0.014 and all variables having a reduced significance, 
including concentration which becomes insignificant, and heteroscedasticity is still present. 
Regressing CAR3 against the Independent Variables individually 
As both the Box-Cox and FGLS approaches had not been successful in addressing the heteroscedasticity 
problem, I then regressed CAR3 on each independent variable individually and attested the 
heteroscedasticity of the resulting residuals in order to in order to see which variables are responsible for 
the heteroscedasticity of the general model. 
The variables that result in heteroscedastic errors when the CAR3 is regressed against them individually 
are: ln_mkt , lt_mkt, instown_hhi, deal_mkt. 
It should be noted that these values are among the values with the highest significance in the original 
model. 
When omitting these variables from the general model, White’s test gives a p value =1 and Breusch – 
Pagan test gives a value of 0.89, so the heteroscedasticity disappears, but the adjusted R square becomes 
0.01 (although the F value is 4.99 which is significant at the 1% level). The concentration variable 
coefficient remains negative and significant as before, but the model explains very little of the total 
variance, less than 1%, whereas in my original model I had and adjusted R
2
 close to 30%, although 
previous papers studying the CAR around the announcement event had adjusted R
2
 ranging from 5% to 
40%. 
Flexible Functional Form 
The persistent heteroscedasticty in the model prevents us from accepting the results of the OLS, but 
maybe the real model isn’t linear at all. A model is defined as nonlinear if the derivatives of the model 
with respect to the model’s parameters depend on one or more parameters. Nonlinear models are often 
derived on the basis of physical and/or biological considerations, e.g., from differential equations, and 
have justification within a quantitative conceptualization of the process of interest.  
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Since the form and the parameters of the nonlinear model are unknown a method to estimate them is the 
Flexible Functional Form: 
   yt
(λ)
 = β1 + β2x2t
(λ)
 + … + + βkxkt
(λ)





 – 1)/λ for λ ≠0 and ln(yt) otherwise. 
The general case is when all the lambdas are potentially different. The special case when lambdas =1 is a 
simple linear regression. 
The method iteratively fits the model for different values of the parameters (given initial parameters and a 
range for Lambda) and calculates the sum of squares between the original data and the fitted model. The 
iterative process stops when the fit can no longer be improved (i.e, the sum of squares doesn’t get any 
smaller) and the fit is said to have converged. 
Solving the model is very computational intensive and beyond the means available to me (my computer 
crashed even for 2 variables) so for illustrative purposes I tried to fit a flexible functional form for the 
dependent variable CAR3 with the explanatory variable ln_mkt. I choose this variable because it was one 
of the variables that resulted in a heteroscedastic variance of the error term when the CAR3 was linearly 
fitted against them individually.  





This method besides being very computationally intensive is also very sensitive and gives different results 
for different ranges of possible parameters. For example, I estimated the model twice; in both estimates 
the starting values for intercept values are between 0.01 and 0.15 (with increment 0.01) and  β1 are 
between 0.01 to 0.1 (increment of 0.01). In the first model Lambda is fitted between 0.5 to 2.5 (increment 
0.5) and in the second case it is fitted between -2.5 to -0.5 (increment 0.5).  
Figures 5 and 6 show the two nonlinear flexible models and table 8 the descriptive results of these fits 






Figure 5. First non linear model 
 
 
Figure 6. Second non linear model 
 
Table 9           
Summary of the first and second non-linear fits for CAR3 vs log of Market Size 
  iteration intercept B1 Lamda 
Sum of 
squares 
First non-linear fit 29 0.0996 -1.2181 0.3481 67.3983 
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In both non-linear models the sum of squares is very similar (and for each case the coefficients are chosen 
so as to have the smallest sum of squares) and the curves are also similar, but all the coefficients are very 
different. Also note that the fitted parameters have different signs depending on the model, which makes 
it hard not only to choose the right model but also to interpret the meaning of the results.  
Omitted Variable Bias 
A reason for heteroskedasticity might be omission of variables from the model. As an illustration, 
consider the following graph: 
 
Just by looking at the data points it seems that they have a quadratic shape, and the model 
Y = α + β1X + β2X
2
 would nicely fit the data (the purple parabola) resulting in no heteroskedasticity. But 
if the quadratic term is omitted and the new model becomes Y = α + β1X (the red line) then there will be 
heteroskedasticity and it can be clearly seen by the greater dispersion of the data points as they get closer 
to the extremes. 
Besides being a potential cause for heteroskedasticity, OVB can result in biased and inconsistent 
estimators. Consistency means that as the sample increases the estimators converge to their true value. 
For illustration, consider the true model: 
Y = A + BX + CZ + u 
If the covariance between X and Z is non-zero such that Z = D + FX + e, and variable Z is omitted from 
the original model, then the regression estimates the following model: 
Y = (A+CD) + (B+CF)X + (u+Ce) and therefore the coefficient of the variable X is biased by CF in order 




Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors 
The model might contain heteroskedsticity inherently. For example, if one looks at the graph of a 
household’s luxury expenditure fitted against its total income, there will be heteroskedasticity because 
households with a small income will spend little on luxury goods, whereas households with a big income 
might spend a lot or be more moderate with their spending, so the increased variability seen for high 
earning households is completely natural. 
 
Heteroskedasticity might also be the result of the data being sampled from different populations. Consider 
the following graph, where there are data from a the blue and the red population, and each is 
homoscedastic as seen by the dispersion around each respective fitted line, but if the model is not aware 
of this, then it will result in the black line fit which is heteroskedastic. 
 
So instead of trying to correct for the heteroskedasticity, it could be assumed as inherent to the model. A 
method to deal with such a situation is using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (HCSE) and an 
33 
 
implementation of this method is described in Hayes et al. (2007). With this method the regression model 
is estimated using the OLS, but an alternative method of estimating the standard errors is used that 
doesn’t assume homoscedasticity. Unlike other methods such as Weighted Least Squares, this method 
doesn’t require knowledge of the functional form of the heteroskedastcity.  
When homoscedasticity is assumed, together with the assumption of uncorrelated errors, the variance 
covariance matrix of the errors, Φ, is equal to σ2I, σ being the variance of the error terms and is constant 
across all observations. The regression estimators matrix Σβ is calculated as (X’X)
-1X’ΦX(X’X)-1 and in 
case of homoscedasticity this equation reduces to σ2(X’X)-1, and for the case of a sample it is 
MSresidual(X’X)
-1
. With HCSE the i
th
 squared error (using the OLS residuals as estimators of the errors) is 
placed into the i
th
 row of the diagonal of the Φ matrix, resulting in Φ “hat” = diag[e2i]. The HCSE 
estimator of the Σβ is now (X’X)
-1X’diag[e2i]X(X’X)
-1
. This estimation can be easily done with SAS  
Table 10       
Regressions results of the model. CAR3 is the independent variable.   
*,**,*** means significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively   
Variable Parameter Estimate  t-value 
HCSE t-
value 
intercept 0.0082 0.22 0.93 
education concentration -0.036 -2.41** -2.23** 
institutional concentration 0.0414 3.61*** 2.34** 
market size 0.0001 0.10 -0.24 
debt to market 0.0174 13.59*** 2.22** 
deal to market 0.0549 30.31*** 3.81*** 
ceo centrality 0 0.49 0.03 
ceo tenure2  -0 -0.16 -0.25 
ceo tenure  0 1.12 1.11 
total boards to date 0.0001 1.26 0.67 
total current boards -0.0004 -0.69 -1.43 
total current boards2 -0 -0.27 -0.36 
independent past cfo fraction 0.13 2.42** 2.16** 
     
board size 0.0137 3.04*** 2.36** 
board size2 -0.0006 -2.72*** -2.29** 
intense monitor -0.0988 -3.24*** -2.16** 
industry relatedness (sic3) -0.0054 -1.81* -1.76* 
industry relatedness (sic2) -0.0063 -2.05** -1.93* 
female -0.0004 -0.19 -0.34 
duality -0.0013 -0.4 -0.23 
priv 0.0356 7.7*** 1.62 
With HSCE, the t-values of the coefficients tend to be lower, but all of the coefficients which were 
significant are still significant, except for the dummy variable which denotes whether the target is private 
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or public, and all the other statistics (R square, F value etc), including the coefficients, are the same as 
before. The only difference is that now there are HSCE-specific t-values, given besides the old ones. SAS 
code is in appendix A8. 
Conclusion 
The educational diversity of the board was found to be positively related to the acquirer’s cumulative 
abnormal return as was predicted in the hypothesis. But the original model contains heteroscedasticity 
which can be eliminated by omitting some of the variables, but this in turn results in a very insignificant 
model. Several attempts to eliminate heteroscedasticity while at the same time retain the significance of 
the model were unsuccessful or practically unfeasible, therefore the results of the model are inconclusive 




This paper is rather introductory and can be expanded in several ways. 
First, I didn’t finalize the part of the flexible functional form due to a lack of computing power, so simply 
having a more powerful computing capability would be a great addition. 
This paper doesn’t include the actual experiences of the directors which might be an even more important 
ability factor than their education, but to my best knowledge there isn’t a database with qualitative 
measures of experience that could be of use. 
The measure of intelligence and its kinds is a whole great science by itself and new theories in fields such 
as psychology, neurology etc. could yield new measures. It would be worthy to use the directors’ IQ and 
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Appendix: SAS Codes 
A1) Chi square test for gender by education categories 
proc freq data=boardex_category_gender; 
tables category*gender/chisq nocol norow nofreq; 
run; 
A2) Distribution of CAR3 
proc univariate data= resids3; 
var car3; 
   histogram car3 / normal grid 
                   endpoints = -0.5 to 0.5 by .05  ; 




proc reg data= data ; 
      model CAR3= concentration  INSTOWN_HHI  ln_mkt lt_mkt  deal_mkt 
ceo_centrality 
 ceo_tenure ceo_tenure2  total_boards_to_date total_current_boards 
total_current_boards2 ind_past_cfo_fraction ind_past_cfo_dummy 
Total_Directors_on_the_Board directors2  intense_monitor ind_past_cfo    
sic_3 govt jv sub priv / p r   ; 
output out=resids3 r=residual;  
   run; 
 
A4) Tests for the heteroskedasticity of the error terms 
proc model data=data; 
      parms a1 b1-b21; 
      car3 = a1 + b1 * concentration + b2 * instown_hhi + b3 * ln_mkt + b4 * 
lt_mkt + b5 * deal_mkt + b6 * ceo_centrality 
+ b7 * ceo_tenure + b8 * ceo_tenure2 + b9 * total_boards_to_date + b10 * 
total_current_boards 
+ b11 *  total_current_boards2 + b12 * ind_past_cfo_fraction + b13 * 
ind_past_cfo_dummy + b14 * Total_Directors_on_the_Board 
+ b15 * intense_monitor + b16 * ind_past_cfo + b17 * sic_3 + b18 * govt + b19 
* jv + b20 * sub + b21 * priv; 
      fit car3 / white pagan=(1 concentration instown_hhi ln_mkt lt_mkt 
deal_mkt ceo_centrality 
ceo_tenure ceo_tenure2 total_boards_to_date total_current_boards 
total_current_boards2 ind_past_cfo_fraction 
ind_past_cfo_dummy Total_Directors_on_the_Board intense_monitor ind_past_cfo 
sic_3 govt jv sub priv ) 
      out=resid1 outresid; 
   run; 




A5) Tests for normality of the error term 
proc univariate data=resids3; 
var residual; 
   histogram residual / normal 










PROC TRANSREG DATA=data2 details pbo; 
ods output data2=bc; 
 MODEL BOXCOX(car3_new/ convenient lambda=-2 to 5 by 0.25) = 
identity(concentration  INSTOWN_HHI  ln_mkt lt_mkt  deal_mkt ceo_centrality 
 ceo_tenure ceo_tenure2  total_boards_to_date total_current_boards 
total_current_boards2 ind_past_cfo_fraction ind_past_cfo_dummy 
Total_Directors_on_the_Board directors2  intense_monitor ind_past_cfo    




A7) Non linear regression 
proc nlin data=data2 method=newton ;parameters  intercept = 0.01 to 0.15 by 
0.01 B1 = 0.01 to 0.1 by 0.01 L = 0.5 to 2.5 by 0.5;model car3   = (1 + 
L*intercept + B1*L*(ln_mkt)**L)**(1/L) ;run; 
proc nlin data=data2 method=newton ;parameters  intercept = 0.01 to 0.15 by 
0.01 B1 = 0.01 to 0.1 by 0.01 L = -2 to -0.5 by 0.5;model car3   = (1 + 
L*intercept + B1*L*(ln_mkt)**L)**(1/L) ;run; 
A8) Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors 
proc reg data= data ; 
      model CAR3= concentration  INSTOWN_HHI  ln_mkt lt_mkt  deal_mkt 
ceo_centrality 
 ceo_tenure ceo_tenure2  total_boards_to_date total_current_boards 
total_current_boards2 ind_past_cfo_fraction ind_past_cfo_dummy 
Total_Directors_on_the_Board directors2  intense_monitor ind_past_cfo    
sic_3 govt jv sub priv / hcc   ; 
output out=resids3 r=residual;  
   run; 
 
